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This paper examines the role of bequests and of taxation on bequests for the
distribution of wealth. We investigate a model with overlapping generations
and heterogenous households where parents derive utility directly from their
bequests. Using the coeﬃcient of variation as measure of equality, bequests per
se diminish the inequality of wealth since they raise private savings and hence
average wealth holdings more than the dispersion of wealth. From a policy
perspective, taxing bequests and redistributing government revenue lump-sum
among the young generation further decreases wealth inequality. These results
also hold when measuring inequality by the Gini coeﬃcient.
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1 Introduction
Most industrial countries levy a tax on wealth transfers. However, there are substan-
tial diﬀerences in the legal framework of the tax system. In France and Germany,
on the one hand, the tax is levied on inheritances. The institutional setting further
forces donors to divide their estate equally among their own children. In the United
States and in the United Kingdom on the other hand, there is a tax on estates and
donors enjoy absolute freedom of bequests (see Cremer and Pestieau, 2003). What
many countries seem to have in common is an ongoing and controversial debate about
taxation of wealth transfers. Some countries, including the US, contemplate to phase
out taxes on wealth transfer in the near future.
One of the main arguments in the public and academic discussion is the role of
wealth transfers for the inequality of wealth. Wealth is highly concentrated: in many
industrial countries, the share of the richest 1% of households in net worth is estimated
to be 20-30% (see Davies and Shorrocks, 2000), whereas an equal distribution would
imply that any π% of the population earn π% of wealth. Wealth transfers in form
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1of bequests or inter vivo transfers are often seen as one of the major culprits for the
wealth inequality.2 Since there is some concern about the level of concentration, the
taxation of wealth transfers is frequently identiﬁed as an adequate policy to mitigate
the concentration of wealth.
This paper investigates the role of bequests for the distribution of wealth and
the eﬀects of redistributive taxation.3 We construct a simple model with stochastic
individual income to analyze distributional eﬀects by comparing steady state distri-
butions in an overlapping generations setting. We ﬁnd ﬁrst that intergenerational
wealth transfers per se have an equalizing eﬀect on the distribution of wealth, when
the coeﬃcient of variation is chosen as the measure of inequality. Second, this result
can be seen in general equilibrium only. Therefore, we consider general equilibrium
analysis as being important. In our model, there is an increase in the variance of
wealth due to wealth transfers, since wealth holdings are determined not only by own
income but by a weighted sum of own and ancestor’s income. Also, private savings
are enhanced due to bequests. This in turn increases average wealth holdings so
that greater average wealth can compensate for higher variance and the inequality of
wealth, as measured by the coeﬃcient of variation, falls. Further, we ﬁnd that this
result is robust when correlation across parent’s and child’s income is introduced into
the model.
When we turn to economic policy, we allow the government to tax bequests and
redistribute revenue among the young. We ﬁnd that the redistributive policy reduces
the variance of wealth while keeping the average wealth holding constant. As a result,
inequality of wealth — again measured with the coeﬃcient of variation — falls. Finally,
we analyse how taxation aﬀects the Gini-coeﬃcient and another measure of inequality,
the share of wealth owned by the richest π% of the population. Our results are robust
to the choice of inequality measure - taxation and redistribution decreases inequality.
We are therefore conﬁdent that our results can directly be used for the policy debate
as the share of wealth owned by the richest π% is the standard measure used in the
public. Note that due to the simplicity of our modeling choice, we are able to derive
all results analytically.
The relation between intergenerational transfers and the wealth distribution has
already found some attention among economists. In contrast to the frequently alleged
concentration increasing inﬂuence, the results of diverse models indicate that inter-
generational wealth transfers do not necessarily enhance wealth inequality, and that
the taxation of wealth transfers might be an inappropriate policy that misses its aim
of redistributing wealth. Two diﬀerent strands can be identiﬁed in the literature.4
2See Charles and Hurst (2003) for an empirical analysis of the reasons for a positive relationship
b e t w e e nw e a l t ho fp a r e n t sa n dc h i l d r e nbefore bequests. Bowles and Gintis (2002) discuss the
various mechanisms through which economic status is transfered across generations. The eﬀect of
tax changes on the importance of gifts relative to bequests are analyzed by Bernheim et al. (2004).
3We do not study eﬃciency aspects as e.g. Blumkin and Sadka (2004) who analyse the eﬃciency
cost of estate taxation. Another recent contribution with further references on the eﬃciency question
is Grossmann and Poutvaara (2005).
4There is also a large literature that looks at wealth inequality and bequests from a quantitative
perspective. Gokhale et al. (2001) are a recent example who also provide an overview of previous
work.
2First, there are models with an explicit bequest motive where parents derive utility
from transferring wealth to their oﬀspring (see e.g. Becker and Tomes, 1979, Laitner,
1979, Davies and Kuhn, 1991, or Cremer et al., 2003). Although there are substantial
diﬀerences in these models, the framework usually is that of overlapping generations,
and the underlying motive for intergenerational transfers is basically family altruism.
Parents either care about the maximum utility their children can attain or about
the wealth of their children. Furthermore, the models consider labour income, which
depends on innate ability, education, or simply luck, as stochastic. Intergenerational
transfers between parents and children are intended to alleviate diﬀerences in utility
across the generations of a family. Capital accumulation, however, is not explicitly
modelled or investigated. It is simply assumed that a stable steady state with sta-
tionary wage and interest rate exists. Second, Stiglitz (1969, 1978) investigates the
distribution of income and wealth among individuals in the tradition of the Solow
growth model. He shows that levying an estate tax may lead to an increase in in-
equality of income and wealth due to capital accumulation eﬀects. Since his model
is in the tradition of Solow, the saving rate and bequests are exogenous and not an
outcome of utility maximizing households. Also, there is no explicit bequest motive
as in the above mentioned literature.
From a modelling perspective, this paper brings together the two strands of the
literature. We partly build on the model of Davies and Kuhn (1991), but in contrast
to their model we take into account capital accumulation eﬀects. Furthermore, as in
the work of Blinder (1974) and Heer (2001), in our model intergenerational wealth
transfers are based on what is called the joy-of-giving bequest motive or paternalism.5
In opposite to altruism, paternalistic parents attain utility either from the amount
they bequeath for the “warm feeling” or from the amount the child inherits. We
assume that the utility is derived from the amount the child receives so that there
is at least a mild form of altruism. As Abel and Warshawsky (1988) have shown,
with correct parameter speciﬁcations quantitative implications of altruism and pa-
ternalism coincide. However, results of the altruistic motive do not have to prevail
for paternalistic transfers as has been shown by Andreoni (1989, 1990) for Ricardian
neutrality and in the context of charitable giving.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the
basic model. Section 3 studies the evolution path of the economy and steady state
properties. In section 4, we study the distribution of wealth and the role of bequests
for inequality. We also allow for a correlation between parent’s and child’s income
as an extension to the basic model. Section 5 then investigates distributional eﬀects
of taxation and checks robustness of our results by using the Gini coeﬃcient as an
alternative measure for inequality. The ﬁnal section concludes.
5For a survey of transfer motives and some of their implications consult Masson and Pestieau
(1997).
32T h e m o d e l
We consider a society with overlapping generations. Each individual lives for two
periods. In each period t t h e r ei sal a r g en u m b e rn of families or dynasties consisting
of one parent and one child. When young, individuals work and earn labour income.
When old, parents are retired, consume their savings, and leave a bequest to the child.
We assume that workers diﬀer with respect to their ability and hence productivity.
Let lit denote the eﬀective inelastic labour supply of an individual i.A tt h eb e g i n n i n g
of period t,e a c hw o r k e rd r a w slit,w h e r elit > 0, from an identical distribution F with
expectation and variance given by
E[lit]=l ≡ 1, Var(lit)=σ
2. (1)
As the lit are identically and independently distributed random variables, their co-
variance is zero, Cov(lir,l is)=0 , for r 6= s. Without loss of generality, we set l =1 .
S i n c ei ne a c hp e r i o da ne q u a ln u m b e ro fi n d i v i d u a l se n t e r sa n dl e a v e st h ee c o n o m y ,
there is a stationary number of families. While the microeconomic level — that is
individual income, inheritance, savings — is characterized by uncertainty, there is
certainty on the per capita level — average eﬃcient labour supply, capital-per-worker,
and interest rate and wage are nonrandom variables. For example, the individual
eﬃcient labour supply lit is a random variable with variance Var(lit)=σ2.T h e
average eﬃcient labour supply is Σn
i=1lit/n with Var(Σn
i=1lit/n)=σ2/n which tends
to zero for n →∞ .T h i sm e a n sf o rn →∞ , the probability that the average eﬃcient
labour supply deviates from its expectation is zero.
2.1 Household behaviour
Individuals consume in both periods and leave a bequest that immediately passes to
their child at the end of the second period. A person belonging to family i,b o r na t








it when young, co
it+1 when old, and the bequest bit+1 passed
on to the child. Note that utility depends on the amount bit+1 the child receives after
tax. In the ﬁrst period, the budget constraint for an individual of generation t is
wtlit + bit + gt = c
y
it + sit,
where bit denotes after tax inheritance received from the parent, wtlit stochastic in-
come depending on wage wt pereﬃciency unit and the random ability of the individual
lit, gt the uniform lump-sum transfer received from the government in case that it




where rt+1 is the interest rate and τ ≥ 0 the tax on bequests. Parents have to take
into account that part of their wealth transferred to the child may be collected by
4the government. With a positive tax rate τ, intending to leave bit+1 to the child, the
parent has to bequeath (1+τ)bit+1. The individual decision is under certainty, since
bequests and labour income are received before deciding about consuming and saving
in the ﬁrst period, and the interest rate is not random.
To keep things as simple as possible, we assume a Cobb-Douglas utility function
Uit = αlnc
y
it +( 1− α)[β lnc
o
it+1 +( 1− β)lnbit+1],
with .5 <α<1, 0 <β<1. The preference parameter α must be larger than .5 as
otherwise individuals would value future utility from consumption and bequests more
than utility from present consumption and the implied time preference rate would be
negative. From the ﬁrst-order conditions one can easily derive consumption in each
period, savings, and bequests left to the child
c
y
it = α(wtlit + bit + gt),
sit =( 1 − α)(wtlit + bit + gt), (2)
c
o
it+1 =( 1 − α)β(wtlit + bit + gt)(1 + rt+1),
bit+1 =
(1 − β)sit(1 + rt+1)
1+τ
. (3)
Independent of their ability or inherited wealth, individuals always consume the share
α of their income wtlit + bit + gt in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h er e s ti ss a v e da n dy i e l d st h e
return 1+rt+1. At the end of the second period, the share β o fs a v i n g sp l u st h e
accrued interest is consumed, 1 − β is passed to the child.
Note that savings in equation (2) are independent of τ.T h et a xo nw e a l t ht r a n s f e r s
drives a wedge between the relative prices of goods. As a consequence, households will
substitute ﬁrst period consumption for bequests. However, due to the Cobb-Douglas
utility, substitution and income eﬀect neutralize each other so that a tax on bequests
does not inﬂuence individual savings.
2.2 Firms
Firms use labour and capital as inputs and produce a single good that can be con-
sumed or invested. Both factors are supplied inelastically. The good is chosen as
numeraire. There is perfect competition, the ﬁr m sm a k ez e r op r o ﬁts. Production ex-
hibits constant returns to scale and is assumed to be of the usual Cobb-Douglas type.
In intensive form, the production function can be expressed as yt = f(kt)=Ak
γ
t ,
where yt and kt are output per worker and capital per worker, respectively. In equi-




− δ = γAk
γ−1
t − δ, (4)






with the net interest rate rt, depreciation rate δ,a n dw a g ewt.
52.3 Government
The government is concerned about the distribution of wealth. The only tax instru-
ment at its disposal is a tax on bequests. The government levies a tax τ ≥ 0 and
redistributes revenue lump-sum among the young generation. The tax is modelled as
a consumption tax that raises the price of the “good” bequest. In each period, the
government’s budget is balanced. Every young individual receives the same transfer




Although there is variation in the individual bequest left to the child and accordingly
diﬀe r e n tt a xr e v e n u ep e rb e q u e s t ,d u et ot h el a r g en u m b e ro ff a m i l i e st h ea v e r a g et a x
revenue of the government is deterministic. Hence, the government does not need to
form expectations about tax revenue.
3 Transitional dynamics and steady state
W ea r en o wi nt h ep o s i t i o nt os t u d yt h ed y n a m i c so fc a p i t a li n t e n s i t yk and to
calculate its steady state value. Furthermore, we can investigate the development of
the distribution of wealth: The law of large numbers tells us that if the individual
probability to "draw" a certain amount of wealth equal to at most ¯ a is given by π%,
then, in a large economy, a share of π% of the whole population will hold at most
that amount of wealth ¯ a. In order to understand the national distribution of wealth,
we therefore just have to understand the properties of the distribution of individual
wealth.
In what follows, we investigate convergence in two dimensions: convergence of
the capital stock on a macroeconomic level and convergence of the distribution of
wealth on a microeconomic level. The distribution of wealth will be studied under
the assumption that the economy has already reached the macroeconomic steady
state.
3.1 The capital stock
Let us ﬁrst study the dynamics of k. From the goods’ market equilibrium it follows
that households’ assets in period t+1— all owned by members of the generation born
in t — equal the period’s capital stock. We will show that a [deterministic] stable
steady state exists. While such a proof is self-evident in deterministic settings, it is
not obvious in our economy with stochastic productivity on an individual level. Using










Inserting sit, bit,a n dgt from (2), (3), and (6) yields















i=1lit+1/n approaches unity, since Σn
i=1lit/n does not
deviate from E[lit]=1for n →∞ . Substituting further for wt and rt from the factor
market equilibrium, we obtain after rearranging
kt+1 = c1k
γ
t + c2kt, (7)
where c1 ≡ (1 − α)(1 − γ)A +( 1− α)(1 − β)γA and c2 ≡ (1 − α)(1 − β)(1 − δ).
Equation (7) determines the evolution of k starting with an initial value. Note that
k is independent of the tax rate τ. Taxing wealth transfers and redistributing tax
yields does not inﬂuence the growth path of the economy.
3.2 Macroeconomic steady state







Wage w and interest rate r are calculated from the marginal product of labour and
capital in the steady state. Plugging k into the factor market equilibrium conditions
















= γ +( 1−γ)c2 < 1, the steady state is locally stable. A simple
graphical analysis reveals that the steady state is also globally stable. Whatever the
initial value of k is, the capital stock converges to k.
3.3 The evolution of wealth and the limiting distribution
We now turn to the evolution on the microeconomic level. Wealth ait+1 of family i in
period t+1is owned by the parent and consists of the savings of the previous period.
Equation (2) implies
ait+1 = sit =( 1− α)(wtlit + bit + gt). (11)
Substituting for bit from (3) and gt from (6) gives
ait+1 =( 1− α)wtlit +
(1 − α)(1 − β)(1 + rt)
1+τ
ait +
τ(1 − α)(1 − β)(1 + rt)
1+τ
kt, (12)
ad i ﬀerence equation that describes the evolution of wealth holdings of a family. As
can be seen from equation (12), several factors determine family wealth in t+1.F i r s t ,
7wage and interest rate of the previous period, which again depend on the capital
intensity of that period, have an inﬂuence. Second, stochastic income and family
wealth of period t,w h i c hi n ﬂuences current wealth via bequests, play an important
role. And ﬁnally, the third term of equation (12) reﬂects the government transfer the
young generation receives.
To calculate an explicit solution for the evolution of wealth ait,w ec o n s i d e ra n
economy where the capital stock has already reached its macroeconomic steady state
value. In such a steady state, capital intensity k,w a g ew, and interest rate r take
their values in (8), (9), and (10) so that we obtain from equation (12)
ait+1 = c3lit + c4ait + c5, (13)
where c3 ≡ (1 − α)w, c4 ≡
(1−α)(1−β)(1+r)
1+τ , c5 ≡
τ(1−α)(1−β)(1+r)
1+τ k.W h e n w e s o l v e












Intuitively, one would want the value of c4 to lie between zero and one as otherwise
the sums do not converge. Analytically, it can be shown that this is indeed true (cf.
app. 8.3). As one can see from equation (14), family wealth in period t depends on
the initial wealth ai0 of the family at t =0 , the transfer of the government, and the
stochastic productivity lis of all preceding generations. The more luck the ancestors
had, the higher was their labour income and the higher are wealth holdings of the
current generation, since part of the ancestors’ luck is shifted into the future via
bequests. However, due to the factor c4,t h ei n ﬂuence of distant luck on current
wealth is weaker than that of parent’s luck.
L e tu sn o wt u r nt ot h ec h a r a c t e r i s t i c so ft h ed i s t r i b u t i o no fw e a l t h .T h ee x p e c t e d



































More precise results concerning the evolution of the expected wealth level of a
f a m i l ya r ep o s s i b l ei fw em a k et h ea s s u m p t i o nt h a ti nt =0 , the steady state capital
stock is divided equally among families so that each family’s wealth holding in period












The evolution of E[ait] is then again given by (15), only that ai0 = a0 = k. It can
then be shown (see app. 8.4) that each family in expectations holds wealth equal to
k in every period and not only in the long run, E[ait]=k ∀t. Note that this is not
8surprising when remembering that we are already in a macroeconomic steady state.
As the latter implies that the average capital stock is given by k for each t, it must
be that the expected wealth holding of a representative family is also k for each t.
When households diﬀer in their initial wealth ai0, they will nevertheless have all
the same expected wealth k, but only in the long run. Expected wealth increases
over time when ai0 < k, it decreases when ai0 > k. T h ev a r i a n c eo fw e a l t h( 1 6 )
unambiguously increases over time but approaches a constant.
When we look at the microeconomic steady state, i.e. at the long run for t






This mean needs to be identical to the aggregate capital per worker stock k as the
aggregate capital stock is just the sum of individual wealth holdings and as all indi-
viduals are equal in this expected sense (see app. 8.4 for an analytical derivation).







When we want to know whether the distribution of ait as a whole, and not just
its expected value and variance, converges to a limiting distribution, we need to




4 lis in (14) converges for t →∞ . While this is
obvious for other terms in (14), this is less obvious for this term given the stochastic
nature of individual productivity in lis. As 0 <c 4 < 1 and when we are willing to
assume that var(lis) < ∞, the two-series theorem — a simpliﬁed version of the well-





converges for t →∞with probability 1.6 We may conclude that a limiting distribution
for ait exists in a fairly general setting.
4 Wealth inequality and bequests
In this section, we will investigate the role of bequests per se for the inequality of
wealth within and across generations, leaving the analysis of tax eﬀects for the next
section. Knowing the expectation and the variance of wealth, we use as our measure






6Note that the assumption of a ﬁnite variance is not satisﬁed for all possible distributional
assumptions for lis (e.g. Kleiber and Kotz, 2003) but note also that the empirical evidence suggests
that var(lis) < ∞ is a realistic assumption.
94.1 Intragenerational inequality
Inserting (18) and (19) into (20), we get an expression for the coeﬃcient of variation
as a function of β. As the sign of dCV (ai∞)/dβ remains ambiguous analytically,7
we obtain information about the eﬀect of bequests on inequality by comparing two
economies, A and B. We assume that they are identical, except that in economy B
households bequeath wealth, i.e. 0 <β<1, while in A they do not (β =1 ). In
economy A, plugging (15) and (16) into (20) and observing that β =1implies c4 =0




In economy B,t h ec o e ﬃcient of variation from equation (20) increases over time as
parents bequeath wealth to the child. In a steady state, the coeﬃcient of variation





















Inequality of wealth is lower in economy B, where parents bequeath part of their
wealth, than in economy A, where parents derive no utility from leaving a bequest. In
contrast to the intuition and general perception, bequests reduce the intragenerational
inequality of wealth.
As Davies and Kuhn (1991) have mentioned, bequests may be equalizing through
dampening shocks. An equalizing eﬀect is also found in our model. But the reason
f o ri tt oo c c u ri sd i ﬀerent. Families in economy B are simply richer on average than
families in economy A, because part of the wealth of the parent is transferred to the
child. This leads to a rise in the denominator of CV in economy B,c o m p a r e dt o
economy A. The same happens to the numerator. While capital intensity is higher
in economy B, workers’ labour earnings in the steady state are also higher in relation
to economy A so that the variance of wealth due to income uncertainty — one might
call this the life-cycle component of savings — is higher. In addition, uncertainty of
bequests also raises the variance of wealth. But since the eﬀect on the denominator
dominates, the coeﬃcient of variation is smaller in economy B than in economy A.
4.2 Social mobility
Besides intragenerational inequality, one may also pay attention to other dimensions
of inequality as for example social mobility across generations. Social mobility, as
7We were able to derive a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition, 2 − 1/α ≤ γ, under which
dCV (ai∞)/dβ ≥ 0.W i t h γ ≈ 1/3 and α close to .5, i.e. with relatively patient households, this
would hold.
10used here, is the degree to which child’s wealth status may deviate from parent’s
status. It measures the ability of descendants of poor families to become rich and
vice versa. Not surprisingly, in our model bequests have a negative inﬂuence on social
mobility. While without bequests mobility is perfect, the wealth status of the child
is solely determined by his own ability, bequeathing part of their wealth parents also
transfer part of their wealth status.
As a formal measure of the degree of immobility, we use the correlation of parent-
child wealth (e.g. Conlisk, 1974). With bequests and τ =0 , according to equation
(13), family wealth in t +1is deﬁned as
ait+1 = c3lit + c4ait.




E[(ait+1 − E[ait+1])(ait − E[ait])]
Var(ait+1)1/2Var(ait)1/2 .
Substituting ait+1 = c4ait + c3lit yields
Cor(ait+1,a it)=
c4Var(ait)+E[c3litait − c3ait − c3litE[ait]+c3E[ait]]
Var(ait+1)1/2Var(ait)1/2 .




so that there is indeed correlation between parent’s and child’s wealth. How strong
this correlation is depends on the parameter c4 and the variance of wealth, which
from (16) depends on other parameters and time.
4.3 Correlation of income
In this section, we relax the assumption that ability and hence labour income of parent
and child is uncorrelated. With positive correlation in earnings, the probability that
children of high income parents earn themselves above average labour income is also
high. In addition, these children receive relatively large inheritances so that wealth
concentration increases. Hence, with correlating family incomes, wealth concentration
could become higher in economy B than in economy A.
As Solon (1992) and Zimmermann (1992), who study intergenerational income
mobility in the U.S., point out, there is substantial correlation in reality. Their results
indicate that the correlation of sons’ log earnings with respect to fathers’ incomes is
at least 0.4.
As a consequence of the correlation in ability, our model now also exhibits corre-
lation between ait and lit. We still assume that government levies no tax on bequests
so that c5 =0 . Recall from equation (13) that family wealth in t+1is then given as
ait+1 = c3lit + c4ait.
11We restrict ourselves to a analytically tractable form of correlation. Following
Davies and Kuhn (1991), we assume that eﬀective labour supply regresses to the
mean across generations according to
lit+1 = l + ν(lit − l)+ it+1,
where l denotes the expected eﬀective labour supply, which for our purposes is set
equal to one, ν with 0 <ν<1 expresses the strength of correlation between fa-
thers’ and sons’ ability, and  it+1 is the realization of an independent and identical
distributed shock with zero mean, ﬁnite variance and a lower-bound suﬃcient to keep
lit+1 > 0.I nt =0 , the process starts with li0 = l +  i0,w h e r el =1.
Despite the correlation of income, the model behaves almost exactly as before:
capital intensity still evolves according to equation (7). In economy A, where bequests
are absent and β =1 , c4 =0so that family wealth aA
it+1 is deﬁned as
a
A












3 =( 1− α)wA. The expected wealth holding is E[aA
it+1]=cA








j=0 ν2j)1/2. In contrast to section 4.1, the concentration of wealth
increases with time although parents do not bequeath wealth. Due to income corre-
lation, the variance of income and hence the dispersion of wealth increases. We can



















In society B,w h e r e0 <β<1 so that parents transfer part of their wealth to the
child, the wealth accumulating process is more complicated. It is possible to calculate
a solution at least in case that ν = c4. Obviously, there is no reason to believe that
both parameters coincide but this is a useful example to gain some intuition. Later
we will argue that this solution should hold for ν 6= c4,t o o .

















































(1 − ν)(1 + ν2)1/2
1 − ν2 .
For 0 <ν<1 the ratio is below one so that in economy B wealth is still more equally
distributed than in economy A.
This result should also hold even when ν 6= c4:I ne c o n o m yB,t h ec o e ﬃcient of
















This expression gets largest for c4 → 0 (e.g. for β =1 ) and the limit is exactly the
case without bequests. Hence, economy B attains the highest level of inequality if
parents do not bequeath wealth as in economy A.F o rc4 6= ν,w ec o n j e c t u r et h a tt h e
sum in equation (25) will not get larger than for c4 = ν. Hence, even in the general
case with c4 6= ν family wealth will be distributed more equally when parents transfer
wealth to their children as in economy B than without bequests as in economy A.
Nevertheless, as mentioned at the beginning, the correlation indeed seems to neu-
tralize at least part of the equalizing eﬀect of bequests. In the previous section,
without correlation of abilities, the ratio of the coeﬃcient of variation between the




, which decreases with c4. The limit of the ratio for c4 → 1 is 0. This would
require that β =0so that the bequest motive is strong in economy B and parents
bequeath all of their savings. In contrast to that, with correlation of income, c4 = ν,
and c4 → 1 t h er a t i oo ft h ec o e ﬃcient of correlation between the bequest case and the
base case, again derived with L’Hôpital’s rule, is
p
1/2. Wealth is more concentrated
in economy A with and without correlation of ability, but the minimal ratio of the
coeﬃcient of variation between economy A and B is higher when there is correlation
of income across generations.
5 Wealth inequality and taxation
The previous section has shown that parental willingness to bequeath wealth reduces
the intragenerational inequality of wealth. We now ask how policy should react to
this. Does taxing bequests further decrease inequality?
5.1 Taxing bequests
Recall that in our model taxing bequests with a tax rate τ>0 does not have any
inﬂuence on private savings. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that Cov(lit+k,l it)=
130 so that there is no correlation of labour income across generations. Given our
starting point that a0 = k,t h ee x p e c t a t i o nE[ait] of family wealth is k, no matter
if there is a redistributive taxation of bequests or not. Instead of calculating the
coeﬃcient of variation, we therefore simply concentrate on the variance of wealth as
measure of inequality.
Again, we will compare two situations: one, where the government levies no tax
(τ =0 ) and one with taxation of bequests (τ>0). We denote the variance with
Var(awt
it ) in the case ’with tax’ and Var(ant
it ) for ’no tax’. We can calculate Var(awt
it )
and Var(ant
it ) from equation (16). Note that in the ’no tax’ case, we can relate cnt
4 to
the deﬁnition of c4 after (13) by cnt




















s=0[c4 [1 + τ]]
2s.
Hence, the dispersion of family wealth decreases when government levies a tax on be-
quests and redistributes revenue among the young generation. Therefore, CV(awt
it ) <
CV(ant
it ) from t ≥ 2 on so that the redistributive policy of the government reduces
intragenerational inequality.8
In the ﬁrst period, redistribution does not yet work because we assumed that
wealth is distributed equally in t =0 . Hence, bequests of that period are also equally
distributed and taxation and redistribution can not alter the concentration of wealth:
wealth already is completely equally distributed. But from t =2on, the tax starts
working and wealth is less concentrated subsequently. Taxation furthermore increases
wealth mobility. The higher the tax rate τ, the less parental wealth determines the
wealth status of the child. The status of the child is then primarily related to own
ability.
The equalizing eﬀect of bequest taxation hinges on several aspects. First, as men-
tioned at the beginning, reactions of parents and children depend on the underlying
motive for wealth transfers. Second, in this model taxing bequests and redistributing
tax revenues does not eﬀect private savings. And third, if wealth is implicitly “lost”
in transit, this in turn would have an inﬂuence on private savings and the evolution
path of the economy with the result that the average wealth holding of families could
decrease. Although the redistribution diminishes the dispersion of wealth, lower av-
erage wealth holdings could then lead to an increase in inequality. Furthermore, one
could argue that the tax on bequests might change the willingness to bequeath. If
government tried to conﬁscate bequests, for example, or would be able to prohibit
bequests, even households with an intrinsic bequest motive would probably stop be-
queathing wealth. This would, as has been shown in the previous section, result in
increased inequality of wealth.
8One should not think of redistribution, as modeled here, to correspond in the real world to a
real per capita transfer of taxes collected by the government. Instead one can think of redistribution
as an implicit transfer, caused e.g. by a reduction of other taxes.
145.2 Lorenz curves and the Gini coeﬃcient
A measure of inequality widely used in the public is the amount of wealth owned by
the richest π% of the population. As this amount is generally far higher than π%o f
total wealth, a society is viewed to have become more equal if this amount reduces.
Perfect equality would mean if for any π ∈ [0,100],π % of the population own π% of
wealth. The corresponding Gini-coeﬃcient would then be zero.
We want to use a similar measure in our model, as we would like to compare our
coeﬃcient of variation results with these more common measures. To obtain such a
measure, take as starting point equation (17). As stochastic labour productivities lis
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In order to be able to obtain properties of the distribution of wealth, we need to
make speciﬁc assumptions about individual productivities lis.9 As the lis determine
the wage distribution, we should use a distribution that is known to reﬂect observed
wage and income distributions relatively well. One plausible candidate as our density
function for productivities lis (see Kleiber and Kotz, 2003, for a recent survey) is the







−x/λ,x > 0, (27)
suggested by Salem and Mount (1974). As empirically plausible parameters we choose
φ =3and λ =1 /3 (which is also consistent with our model assumption of E (lit)=1
as the expected value of a gamma random variable is φλ).
Given this distributional choice for individual productivities lis, we now have to
understand the distributional properties of ai∞. As this is analytically not feasible,
we use well-known approximation methods that allow to reasonably well proxy the
distribution of ai∞ (also) by a gamma distribution. This is done by "χ2-type approx-
imations" (e.g. Mathai and Provost, 1992, pp. 163 - 165), i.e. matching moments of
the gamma distribution and the moments predicted by (26). The latter moments were
computed explicitly in (18) and (19) without making a speciﬁc assumption concerning
lis. Hence, they are valid for our gamma assumption for individual productivities.












where the left-hand sides show the mean and variance of the assumed gamma distrib-
ution for ai∞ and the right-hand sides are moments from (18) and (19). Dividing the
9Our coeﬃcient of variation results were more general in the sense that they only required the
existence of the ﬁrst and second moment of ait. Hence, we only had to specify the expected value
and variance of individual productivities lit in (1).
15second by the ﬁrst gives λ = c2
3σ2/[(c3 + c5)(1+c4)] and reinserting into (28) gives
φ =( c3 + c5)
2 (1 + c4)/((1 − c4)c2
3σ2).
The advantage of the gamma distribution is its property that implied Lorenz
curves do not intersect (e.g. Kleiber and Kotz, 2003, p. 164). A higher φ implies
a Lorenz curve that is closer to the 45◦-line. Inequality as measured by the Gini
coeﬃcient or the share of wealth owned by the richest π% of the population therefore
decreases in φ. Hence, in order to understand the eﬀects of taxation on inequality
measured in this way, we simply need to understand whether φ increases in τ.As this
is the case, i.e. dφ/dτ ≥ 0 (cf. app. 8.1), higher taxation leads to lower inequality
also if the measure of inequality used is the Gini coeﬃcient or the amount of wealth
owned by the richest π%.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper analysed the distributional impact of wealth transfers for a bequest-as-
consumption motive. Summarizing, the role of bequests for the inequality of wealth
is mixed. From a preference perspective, willingness to bequeath causes mobility to
decrease, while the intragenerational equality of wealth is increased. In our model,
β is the parameter that covers parents’ willingness to bequeath. The higher β,t h e
lower is the share of parental wealth the child receives. As has been shown in this
paper, expected wealth and variance of wealth go down with β.S i n c e t h e e ﬀect
on expected wealth dominates, the coeﬃcient of variation also goes down: Bequests
decrease wealth inequality.
From a policy perspective, levying a wealth transfer tax and redistributing revenue
among the young generation, the government can further reduce the concentration of
wealth. The higher the tax τ on bequests, the lower is the variance of wealth, while
average wealth holdings are not eﬀected. As a consequence, the coeﬃcient of variation
is reduced by the tax. Hence, the government can follow a bequest taxation policy in
order to reduce wealth inequality, even though the willingness to bequeath wealth, as
captured by the preference parameter β,does not result in increased wealth inequality.
However, if government undertook some legal action to prohibit wealth transfers, or
if government introduced a complete conﬁscatory tax, then the distributional impact
could change. This would happen, if parents’ willingness to bequeath is driven to
zero so that they consume all their savings when old instead of bequeathing part of
their wealth.
While these results hold for the coeﬃcient of variation as a measure of inequality,
we have shown that they also hold for other, "more popular" measures like the Gini
coeﬃcient of the share of wealth held by the richest π% of the population. Taxing
bequests reduces the Gini coeﬃcient and reduces the amount of wealth owned by the
richest parts of the population.
Clearly, there are certain limitations in our setup. In order to derive explicit so-
lutions, we had to develop a model as simple as possible with fairly simple utility
and production functions. Future work should relax some of these assumptions. For
example, it would be interesting to consider a CES utility function and to investigate
16the dependence of results on the elasticity of substitution. While a closed-form solu-
tion would still be possible, a CES utility would allow for a richer inter-dependence
between taxation and savings which opens up new channels neglected here.
7A p p e n d i x
We investigate here the mean reverting process introduced in section 4.3 and its
implications for the variance of wealth in equation (22) in more detail. Section 4.3
builds on the stochastic process lit+1 = l+ν(lit−l)+ it+1.G i v e nli0 = l+ i0 we obtain
lit+1 = l +
Pt+1
j=0 νt+1−j ij with expectation E[lit+1]=l and variance Var(lit+1)=
ν2Var(lit)+σ2 = σ2 Pt+1
j=0 ν2j. Covariance Cov(lit+k,l it) between the ability of the
child of family i in period t + k and the ability of the ancestor working in period t is
deﬁned as
Cov(lit+k,l it)=E[(lit+k − E[lit+k])(lit − E[lit])].
Inserting lit+k and taking into account that E[ it+mlit]=E[ it+m]E[lit]=0for m>0,





Remember, equation (17) describes the evolution of family wealth. With c5 =0





4 lis. Since one has to take into
account Cov(lit+k,l it), the expression for the variance of wealth Var(ait) becomes
rather complicated. Assuming that c4 = ν, which is at least possible for both variables









which can be seen from calculating the expression for the variance for the ﬁrst periods
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